Human Factors - "The Ethnic Theory of Plane Crashes"

What are Human Factors?

You have probably heard of human factors including hypoxia, ozone sickness, carbon monoxide, smoking, hyperventilation, decompression sickness, vision (depth perception, night vision, DERP) hypothermia, sensory illusions, spacial disorientation, physical fitness, stress, attitude etc.

All of the above have a great impact on how the pilot will perform, react, communicate, feel...

By complete fluke, I have recently stumbled upon a 'factor' I didn't expect to make the list.

I'm currently reading a book entitled Outliers: The Story of Success (If you have heard of The Tipping Point or Blink, this book is by the same author) . One of the chapters is entitled: "The Ethnic Theory of Plane Crashes". I know it sound a little dramatic, but Malcolm, the author, embarks on a second-by-second reenactment of one of the most horrific plane crashes in recent history.

The reader is introduced to a word-for-word transcript from the black box of communications between the pilot, first officer, flight engineer and ATC. When you first read how the action unfolds, you can't necessarily pinpoint anything that is wrong with the decisions of the pilots or ATC (or at least I couldn't).

Mind you the weather was not cooperating, the pilot was tired but this is not unusual after a 12+ hr flight.

Some facts about the pilot and the flight:

• Captain of the plane was 42 years of age, fit, healthy, prepared for the trip
• 8900 hours of flight time (3200 in jumbo jets)
• Plane: Korean Air Boeing 747 (KAL 801)
  
• Flight to Guam from Kimpo (over 7000km trip)
• VOR/DME approach (glide slope equipment was out of service that night)
  
• Pilot flew there 8 times that route in the past
• Haven't slept for over 12 hrs
  

Here is a short transcript from the last few moments of the flight. See if you can spot anything odd...

Last few minutes of the flight:

1:20:01Captain: ...with 8 hrs we get nothing...they make us work to max...
1:21:13 Captain: Eh, I'm really sleepy
1:21:13 First Officer: Of course
....
1:29:xx Flight engineer: Is it Guam?
1:29:xx Flight engineer: It's Guam!
1:29:xx Captain: Good!
1:29:xx Flight engineer: Captain, the weather radar has helped us a lot.
1:29:xx First Officer to ATC: Clear of Charlie Bravo (cumulonimbus clouds), request vectors for runway six left
1:30:xx ATC: Korean 801, Roger...cleared ILS runway six left approach, light slope unusable
1:30:xx Captain: Let's make a visual approach
1:41:48 Captain: Wiper on
1:41:59 First Office asks : Not in sight?
1:42:00 GPWS: Five hundred feet
1:42:02 Flight engineer: Eh?
1:42:19 First officer: Let's make a missed approach
1:42:20 Flight Engineer: Not in sight?
1:42:22 First Officer: Not in sight
1:42:23 Flight Engineer: Go around
1:42:24 Captain: Go around
1:42:24 Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS): One hundred
1:42:24 GPWS: Fifty
1:42:25 GPWS: Fourty
1:42:25 GPWS: Thirty
1:42:25 GPWS: Twenty
1:42:26 Sound of initial impact
1:42:28 Sound of tone
1:42:30 Sound of tone
End of Recording

Did you pick up anything strange, peculiar? Can you spot the issue?

Here are some stats from late 90s...when this accident occurred:

Loss rate in US - 0.27 per million departures (meaning one lost plane in 4 million flights)
Loss Rate in Korea - 4.79 per million departures - 17 times higher (at one point this stat was so bad that Canadian officials considered revoking overflight and landing privileges in Canadian airspace)

Why was the loss rate 17 times higher in Korea?

You may argue that US pilots are better qualified and trained than Korean pilots, that may be true but is that the main reason?...Upon a closer look, they did spot some interesting trends...not just with Korean Air accidents...

• They found that in 52% of 'losses' the pilot has been awake for more than 12 hrs
• 44% of the time, the two pilots (captain-first officer) have never flown together
• Crashes are more likely to occur when the Captain is the PIC (pilot in command)

Can you believe the last point? Seems contrary to popular belief.

Why would the last point be true? Does it have to do with the fact that older pilots are worse than their younger stallion counterparts?

Far from it.

One of the issues has to do with something the author labels as Mitigated Speech, or the tendency of the speaker to downplay the meaning of what is being said, including when we are polite, ashamed, embarrassed, intimidated by authority etc.

The truth is the first officer is less likely to 'speak up' when an issue arises to the Captain due to this phenomenon. You don't want to tell your boss he/she is doing something wrong...hence undermining their authority.

Planes are generally safer when the less experienced pilot (first officer) is flying because the captain is perfectly content to tell the first officer they are doing something wrong!

Crazy but true. So, let's go back to the situation described above? Why did the Korean airline suffer many more losses? Can you spot the issue in the transcript?

When you look closely, you will find the tone and approach of the first officer and the flight engineer is very passive and in some cases they fail to speak up at all. They basically let the captain make the mistakes...They are just not assertive enough when the time requires them to be. By the way, the investigation ruled that the Pilot made some critical procedural errors including not following standard non precision VOR/DME approach. Here is the official accident report. The crew failed to point out the issues when they had the chance to the Captain.

Malcolm goes further to explain this issue by introducing, Geert Hofstede and Hofstede's Dimensions (Power Distance Index (PDI), Individualism, Uncertainty Avoidance, Masculinity) that help us understand cultural differences and their tendencies.

Check out this site for a global map of scores such as world map of power distance scores.
According to the book, Korea like many Asian countries has a very high PDI, meaning there is an overwhelming tendency for subordinates (flight officer and engineer) to acknowledge the power of others simply based on where they are situated in a formal, hierarchical position. In this culture it is expected to speak only when spoken to, follow orders rather than offer suggestions, don't speak up when speaking with people of higher standing than your own etc.

This provides us with a hint to why Korean first officer and the engineer didn't speak up...they probably felt it was not their place to do so!

How would most Canadian pilots react? Let's assume the answer lies with Canada's PDI score:

Power Distance (lower score means we have much less issue with authority, we consider each other equals)

UK - 35
Canada - 39 (we are generally not afraid to speak up even with our superiours! and hence we would be more likely to say something when in dire straits)
US - 40
China -80
India - 77
Venezuela - 81

Check out Individualism (high in Canada), Uncertainty Avoidance (low in Canada), Masculinity (balanced in Canada).

Next time you fly with someone, remember; count mainly on yourself, not your co-pilot, ATC. Always retain the responsibility but most importantly work as a team!

If you are wondering...Korean Air has discovered the root of the issue and now is one of the safest airlines in the world! One solution was to enforce English in their crew communications that alleviated some of the formality of the Korean language hence reducing the issue of Mitigated Speech. Many other airlines have also invested in training their first officers and other crew to reinforce the importance of communicating with the Captain especially in times of luring danger.

Make sure to take the above into consideration when flying. Remember, safety first!

P.S. Outliers: The Story of Success is not an aviation book. It really is a deconstruction of the notion of 'success'. Certainly intriguing, and I would recommend to those with an inquiring mind.

Here is a link to the author's quick intro: http://www.amazon.ca/gp/mpd/permalink/m3K73VOL0U85ZQ

On a brighter note. Have a look at Seinfeld's take on some of the issues surrounding cultural dimensions including personal space....http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j41tJdqZX7E

Turns - useful rule of thumb

If you are a student pilot, you most likely have heard the term "Standard-Rate Turn" .

The definition is :

"A standard rate turn for (light) airplanes is defined as a 3° per second turn, which completes a 360° turn in 2 minutes. This is known as a 2-minute turn, or rate one (= 180°/minute)."

Thanks Wikipedia!

In layman's terms, turn at a rate at which you can complete a full circle in 2 minutes...

The bigger question why do I care...

Here are a few examples why it may be useful

• Air traffic Control - ATC uses standard turn rates in providing traffic separation.
• Instrument flying and IFR conditions - when you can't see where you are, using the standard rate is critical in telling you where you will be when making turns just using the correct turn bank angle and time piece.
• Intercepting, tracking, departures, approaches and other maneuvers are all accomplished using standard rate turns.
• If you are going for your IFR rating, you need to know all about the SRT and you need to perform it too.
  
• ....and my fave: It's always good to know you can be on your way back to the direction you came from in one minute:)
  

In not going to go into explaining how to use the turn coordinator or a turn and bank indicator but rather help you figure out the bank angle needed to get you into the standard rate turn....

Here is the easy to remember rule of thumb:

Divide your airspeed in knots by 10 and add 7.

For example, if your airspeed is 100 kt, your bank angle will be 17° (10 + 7).

Voila!

123s of Radio range

First of all, I want to wish you all a Happy New 2009! Do you have a New Year's resolution? I know I do.

All the best in your aviation studies and training. Remember to have fun and to stay safe!

Here is a short post I think will prove useful.

Here is a sample exam question:

You are flying at 8,500 feet above the VOR station and you are wondering for how many more miles you can expect to receive a readable VOR signal from the station.

A. 100 nm
B. 92 nm
C. 184 nm
D. 113 nm

What is the answer?

First thing to understand is that VOR uses VHF radio signal which stands for Very High Frequency. VHF is mainly used for FM radio, TV and two way radio communications. Unlike low, medium frequency radio signal, very or ultra high frequencies do not 'bend' much around the surface of the earth, Very High Frequencies can only be received by the receiver that is in line-of-sight to the sending station.


In order to calculate the max line-of-sight distance in nautical miles from the transmitter (ATC, VOR, DME) and the airplane, you use the following simple calculation:

1.23 * square root of airplane's altitude above the station

Let's take the exam question and calculate the distance.

1.23 * square root of 8,500=113.4

You can also do an easy mental check. You know that if the altitude is 10,000 AGL, the answer will be 123 nm. Generally, you can assume an altitude lower than 10,000 AGL will generate a shorter distance. On a practical level, remember that if you are out of comm range, one way to get into range is to climb. However it is also reasonable to expect that at higher altitudes you can encounter more interference from other transmitters on similar frequencies hence weaker signal etc.

Now that you know all that...

The answer to the exam question above is D.